The only way Ford is going to get union protection in his plants ... is to have the UAW transformed into a strongly centralized organization exerting iron discipline over its constituent locals and over its rank and file.
dues. The Formula was later adopted in most union contracts in mass industry. The union's new financial security, however, was won at a price. In many ways, Rand's decision required union leaders to become more responsible to employers than to their members. It weakened the ties between union leaders and members, especially because union representatives no longer collected dues from each worker. Rand also put teeth in union leaders' obligation to repudiate workers' direct action. Failure to do so could lead to the forfeiture of union dues payments. The resulting institutional separation of union leaders from their members became increasingly embedded in Canada's Wagner model. As labour historian Bryan Palmer has concluded, Rand "set the tone for the postwar period." 8 Yet Canada's Wagner model was not permanently entrenched until the passage of the federal Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (IRDIA) in 1948. The IRDIA'S predecessor, PC 1003, had been extended for two years after the war, but it had been a temporary measure. It was not until after 1948 that the core of the IRDIA, and hence the Wagner model, was adopted by most provinces. Key prewar provisions, such as the compulsory conciliation of disputes before legal strikes, combined with the subsequent elaboration of legalistic grievance and arbitration procedures to advance the Wagner model. This model legitimated and stabilized unions at the cost of confining them in a web of legalistic obligations which limited their members' ability to engage in militant action.
In this context, a more hierarchical, bureaucratic and legalistic unionism arose to replace the more militant, rank-and-file centred, and class-oriented unionism of the 1930s and 1940s. Senior union leaders generally facilitated this shift. In 1949, for example, the UAW International Executive Board gained the constitutional power to discipline workers when local leaders refused. 9 Collective bargaining gains were increasingly based on productivity improvements that required workers and unions to cooperate with overall managerial control. In 1950, for example, the Canadian UAW signed a three-year contract with Ford in return for major productivity-based wage increases. I0 The Wagner model was thus a compromise in which industrial unionism shifted from a greater emphasis on mobilizing workers through militancy and class solidarity to one which centred on bargaining multi-year contracts that guaranteed labour peace. This required workers to drop any ambi- In sum, this framework encouraged a quiescent labour politics. Since the industrial relations system focussed on individual workplaces or firms rather than economic sectors or the national economy, there was less likelihood of class-defined unionism developing. The Wagner model implied mat conflicts between workers and their employers mainly concerned how to 'divide die pie' rather than bow to make it Just as Canadian Fordism was built around the Wagner model, so the Wagner model was built around a particular regime of labour relations in die workplace. With Fordism based on a Taylorist division of labour, that regime was defined by a managerial monopoly over die strategic areas of decision-making, such as the organization of work, and die location of investment Prior to this set of changes, wartime industrial unionism had contained strong elements of rank-and-file militancy that threatened managerial prerogatives. As will be seen, UAW Local 200 at Ford in Windsor, Ontario, typified this kind of unionism. Indeed, a culture of worker direct action diere during the war ledio die 1945 Ford strike which resulted in the Rand decision. The strike -together with the wave of strikes by steelworkers, packinghouse workers, rubber workers, miners, loggers and others, which came in its wake -represented the zenith of this militant rank-and-file unionism. From that point on, much of die initiative passed from workplace action by workers and local leaders to a less militant, more hierarchical unionism centred on national and international union leaders and staff. This transition took place not only in the UAW but throughout industrial unionism in Canada.
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This new unionism took shape during die late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. While many analysts have focussed almost exclusively on union elites, die import of this transition is most evident at die local union level. This can be seen most clearly in die formation of new locals which lacked the traditions of wartime militancy and solidarity. Because the concern here is to analyse the consequences of Canadian Fordism on unions, the focus of this paper is on die postwar years. More particularly, this paper centres on the formation of UAW Local 707 at a Ford assembly plant in Oakville, Ontario in the early 1950s, when the transition to the new unionism was more advanced. Local 707 has the advantage, for analytical purposes, of being created in the context of a partial transfer of operations from Ford Windsor. This organic relation between the two locals provides a unique vantage point for assessing die shift from one kind of unionism to another.
Although 12 While it is important not to ascribe widespread radical consciousness to dus militancy, it is nevertheless true that the militants' struggles were part of a broader working-class mobilization in die 1930s and early 1940s. These struggles against their authoritarian anti-union employer were sustained by considerable solidarity generated inside die plants and in working-class neighborhoods. Their organizing efforts paid off in 1941 after the UAW organized Ford in die us and then put pressure on Ford of Canada. For several years after die first union contract with Ford of Canada in 1942, leaders of UAW Local 200 constituted an organic part of worker resistance to speedup, paternalism, favouritism, and other dimensions of managerial power in die workplace. Throughout die war, union leaders, especially at die local level, supported many job actions, big and small. 13 However, senior UAW leaders became more ambivalent about such direct action as they perceived that by acting as guarantors of industrial peace they could achieve union security in die context of die Wagner model.
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As noted earlier, die federal government's introduction of PC 1003 in 1944 granted union rights to organize and to bargain collectively, as well as other concessions, but also required union leaders to discourage rank-and-file direct action and to channel workplace conflicts into the grievance and arbitration procedure. 13 There were numerous sympathy strikes, and a nation-wide general strike almost erupted. Throughout, a majority of Local 200 remained strongly committed to die strike. When Ottawa arranged an arbitration offer, die strikers voted it down, despite pressure from most top UAW leaden. The workers and local union leaders finally voted to end die strike only after further pressure from senior UAW leaders.
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As previously emphasized, die subsequent Rand decision was a turning point The ruling required all workers, not just union members, to pay union dues, thereby placing union finances, and mus union organization, on firmer ground. In return, labour leaders were to suppress direct action by die members. The Rand decision explicitly stated that although management would be concerned about die cost of die checkoff and die greater strength dus might give die union, managerial power would be fortified:
... the expense can properly be taken as the employer's contribution toward making the union through its greater independence more effective in its disciplinary pressure even upon employees who are not members, an end which the Company admits to be desirable.
In addition, die Rand Formula implied a reduction in die UAW'S reliance on workplace stewards and substewards who had been collecting dues from each member. Finally, the power of the senior Canadian and International UAW leadership was reinforced by the dependency of many small parts plants and depots on the UAW for a variety of union services such as leadership training, and arbitration assistance. Because the UAW gave small locals the right to send at least one delegate to all UAW conventions, and subsidized these delegates' travel and accommodation so they could attend, the small locals carried a disproportionate political weight which was biased in favour of the senior leadership. Of 15 retired workers interviewed for this study, only two recalled that they had had any reluctance to sign up. Taylor reported that some were reluctant to join the union before their three month probation period ended (Report of Organizing, 23 June 1953, WSU, UAW Canada Officers, Box 66 Folder 1).
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A former local president reported diat he signed a union card on his first day in die plant Pat Clancy, "Local 707 is Forty Years Old," 707 Reporter (September 1993), 7. phere" at Oakville, as one retiree put it Supervision tended to be less obtrusive at Oakville in mis period, and in some areas the workers supervised themselves, although conflict with supervisors also existed.
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In Windsor, many Ford workers had forged solidarity not only through working together but also by living in the same working-class communities. In contrast, most Oakville workers had few ties with each other outside of work. Those who did have ties to fellow workers outside the plant were mainly linked to workers in their own particular locales, such as Brantford This reflected the way die company recruited workers. Ford hired workers from a wide geographic range, from southern Ontario centres such as Windsor, Brantford, Toronto and Hamilton, and from much further away, including centres such as North Bay, Montréal, Ottawa and other areas. 98 Less than ten per cent of die workforce was from die Oakville area. 59 Residential diffusion was reinforced by a dearth of affordable housing in Oakville which prompted workers to commute long distances.* 0 Since there was less socializing among workers after work uian was typical among workers at Ford Windsor, Taylor had to correspond with "key men? in several locales. 61 Ford's Oakville workforce was also fragmented by growing ethnic heterogeneity. As noted, this reflected recent immigration from Eastern Europe in particular.
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The long hiring process also hindered development of a union consciousness. Although the local was certified by a vote of ninety-five per cent of die workers,
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Ford hired a great many workers after the certification. As a result, by die time of the first contract strike at Oakville in 1954, only about half die 3200 workers in die plant had had an opportunity to vote to join die UAW. 64 Although they were eligible for strike benefits, those who were not members of die union were not eligible to vote for local leaders or die strike, or to ratify die contract. See, for example, the grievance of E. Wisltin, a steward fired for "using abusive language to the supervisor," and that of A. Petrusaitis, found guilty of criminal assault on a supervisor, Arbitrator's Report, Most important of all, the members' identification with the local was weakened by the ongoing centralization of power in the UAW. From the outset, Local 707 was highly dependent on the national and international levels of the UAW. In part, this dependency developed because many members and local leaders were "green'* to the UAW and to organized labour generally. They depended on die International to help resolve election disputes, settle dues issues, and approve local bylaws, primarily because of the many precedents which had built up. These regulations were part of the UAW hierarchy's control over local leaders and members.
Local 707 was also subordinated to the UAW'S broader bargaining strategy. Because the UAW wanted to create one basic agreement covering Ford locals in Windsor and Etobicoke too, Local 707 had to wait for these contracts to expire. For several months after certification the local was "very dead and very cautious," Taylor recalled. A retired worker, who had been the secretary-treasurer of the local at the time, reported that it was hard to get more than one or two hundred to attend membership meetings and that local UAW leaders "had to educate them about the union.' Yet there was a reasonable turnout in the fall of 1953 at a special general members' meeting called to elect the local executive. 67 Indicative of the internal, often geographically-based divisions, members from Brantford, Hamilton and Windsor met separately to select candidates from their respective areas before nominating them at the meeting. 68 The Brantford group, which included many workers from UAW locals in the area, was especially prominent on this first local executive.
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In the months prior to the first contract, there were no elected union representatives in the plant. Because of this, and because the local executive board had no contractual status, Taylor had a great deal of control over the local. Inside the plant, Taylor's influence was extended through an unofficial cadre of "key men" who became the nucleus of official in-plant union representation (committeemen and stewards) later on. Despite dus union-management cooperation, many strikers put up with considerable economic hardship. Strike pay was low and many found it difficult to get by.
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The spouse of die first local president recalled that when he was at negotiations, her family "was lucky because [he] wasn't eating at home." 80 Those who needed more could obtain union vouchers to help pay their rent, heating, utilities, transportation, etc., 81 but hardships were by no means eliminated. The local arranged for a finance company to help those who had good credit ratings meet their car Oakville, with its polo grounds, exclusive private boys' school, 'millionaires' row' of estates along the shore of Lake Ontario, and the highest per capita income in Canada at the time, was anything but a union town. So even though the strike was largely invisible, and the plant was located six miles outside of town, there was public hostility. 76 payments, but there were many repossessions. Local activists visited union locals and labour councils across Canada to obtain strike donations and moral support* 3 The spouses of die local president and Taylor, the UAW representative, prepared food for die picketers. 84 And it was not out of character for supervisors to donate directly to die strike fund. Taylor recalled that some of diem "got a hold of me and asked if they could put a twenty dollar grocery order on some striker's kitchen table."
Meanwhile, contract negotiations dragged on in die boardrooms of Toronto's expensive Royal York Hotel. According to George Burt, director of die Canadian region of die UAW, die strike issues were "not earth-shaking" since most had been gained in other UAW contracts. Except for protesting management's reorganization of departments and die contracting out of some jobs, die UAW did not oppose die language Ford proposed concerning management's rights to control production.*
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The main bargaining demands were a 15 cent wage increase and fully paid medical and hospital insurance with family coverage.* 6 As Samuel Gompers would have put it, the UAW wanted "more. ' Although other demands included contract language against sex discrimination and also a union role in die apprenticeship program , these had little priority. insurance and the normal wage during layoffs, Canadian workers did not Although an overall majority (of the combined votes of the three locals) ratified the contract, many Oakville workers were dissatisfied. The spouse of one striker explained that "a lot of workers voted [to accept the contract] because they were desperate. It had gone on so long that tbey were at wits' end corners." If the Oakville workers had voted down the contract, it would have been accepted anyway, because the Windsor workers, most of whom favoured the contract, vastly outnumbered the Oakville members.
The strike thus ended with a mixture of relief and resentment The members of Local 707 had signed union cards, elected a local executive, given them a strike mandate, and gone on strike throughout the cold winter, but they had been frozen out of most key decisions, including contract negotiations. They voted on a contract they had not seen before and were angered that the UAW overrode their objection to seniority transfer from Windsor. ' They returned to their repetitive, never-ending Taylorized tasks on the assembly lines and to the same supervisors. But now they had union stewards. Complaints covered by the contract could be filed as a grievance, but once filed, it was out of the workers' hands. And any direct action would violate a contract which was policed by the union as well as management In return, workers gained some improvements in their wages and benefits. Such was the new unionism. As it turned out there were fewer transfers from Oakville than many had feared, so the transfer of seniority was less of a burden to most Oakville workers than they had anticipated.
Conclusion
Many made sacrifices during the strike and struggled to support their families. Some picketed for long hours. Some attended information meetings to hear reports from union leaden concerning the contract talks. But for the most part they looked on while decisions were made for them, often by senior union leaden they did not know and had not elected. By now, initiative in their own organization had passed almost entirely from the hands of these unionized workers.
Even though the interests of the larger and established Local 200 dominated contract bargaining in 1954, the logic of a provincial agreement was to centralize power in the hands of union leaden above the local level This was part of die shift from a more member-centred and local-centred unionism to a top-down, bureaucratic union structure. Greater centralization was also conducive to building a more cohesive industrial consciousness among union members, in mis case an "autoworker" identity. However, in the context of die Wagner model this identity was less likely to be a developmental step in die direction of class consciousness. A potentially transformative class politics might have developed out of struggles centred on production (e.g. challenging die prerogative of management to impose key aspects of Taylorism). Instead, die new unionism was largely confined to struggles around marginal modifications to die distribution of profits. In effect, Wagner unionism fostered a politics of consumption it could satisfy, at least for a time.
In die context of die increasing depoliticization and working-class fragmentation in die 1950s, greater union centralization had contradictory implications for die power of organized labour. Left to rely on their own resources, individual union locals would have been more vulnerable to managerial and state coercion. Without a certain stability of membership and finances, die UAW as a whole would also have been much more vulnerable to employer aggression. Yet, in die context of die Wagner model, die union was hamstrung by die very compromises tiiat gave it die stability and legal legitimacy it needed. Moreover, die UAW leaders became more and more cut off from, indeed opposed to, die militancy and solidarity that gave vitality and moral impetus to die union. In this period, a more dynamic unionism, die sort workers created at Local 200 during die war, would have required both a continuing mobilization in die workplace to challenge management control, and a central union structure to coordinate, consolidate and politicize these rank and file initiatives on an ongoing basis. This is precisely what did not happen.
Except for certain limits to managerial prerogatives, such as detailed job classifications and seniority rules, by this time die union regarded management's overall control of die labour process as non-negotiable. Indeed, die union's commitment not to allow Taylorist productivity gains to be jeopardized by work stoppages was die prime precondition of die entire Wagner model. In addition to die coercive power of management and die state which lay in reserve, die union's agreement to use die grievance procedure as a substitute for direct action for die duration of die contract was die main guarantee that management control of die labour process would not be challenged. As union leaders took responsibility for maintaining industrial peace after the war, tbey made a priority out of issues that could easily be monetized, such as wages and pensions. They therefore weakened any potential to make gains in areas such as working conditions which would have pitted them against management control. The Wagner model thus vitiated class politics by limiting conflicts between 'us and them' to the distribution of productivity gains. Labour-management adversarialism was not eliminated, but the UAW helped to focus worker discontent on a narrower economism. At the same time, while the UAW leaders did not articulate serious demands to limit managerial rights to control production, neither did the members. As long as postwar rates of economic growth continued, this Wagner model unionism was a 'win-win* recipe for industrial-relations stability.
Potential for the development of class consciousness and action was further undermined because Wagner model bargaining focussed on individual workplaces and companies rather than the provincial or national economy. In contrast to bargaining organized around class interests, as under stronger variants of Fordism elsewhere, workers' immediate material interests appeared to depend more on the fortunes of 'their' workplaces or firms than on the power and influence of the working class as a whole. The emphasis that the UAW placed on health insurance in the 1954 Ford negotiations, for example, would not have been necessary under a more social democratic Fordism.
The new unionism was also conditioned by a restructuring of class identities after the war. Memories of depression privations and of wartime insurgency were receding. The spatial basis of class solidarity also eroded as workers dispersed over a wide commuter range. Whereas most Ford Windsor workers had lived in relatively homogeneous industrial working class communities, the Oakville workers came from many different places and increasingly moved to mixed class suburban tract homes.
113 Class identities were also increasingly fragmented as industrial workforces became more ethnically and racially heterogeneous. 114 The biggest factor reshaping class identities, however, was the economic boom which helped legitimate the Fordist compromise. Large sections of the working class, unionized autoworkers not least among them, now enjoyed a level of job security and a standard of living that was unprecedented in the history of the working class. Although recessions had not been eliminated and there was no resolution to the tyranny of Taylorism, postwar mass consumption was a powerful palliative defining much of the ethos of the new unionism and the industrial working class.
The founding of the Oakville local in the early 1950s exemplifies in microcosm the main features of the impact of the Wagner model on postwar industrial unionism in r«n»H» A new, hierarchical, legalistic and bureaucratic unionism arose which helped managers pacify and control workers, and excluded most of mem from any meaningful participation in their workplaces and in their unions. The heart of Canadian Fordism lies in this change in the nature of unionism. In addition to documentary sources and to interviews with local UAW leaders, this study is based on interviews with 15 'rank and file ' workers, now retired, who were among the original members of Local 707. To protect the identities of those who asked for anonymity, no names have been used in reference to these interviews.
